

From Ajmer to Ahmedabad: The changing tactics of the Hindu Mahasabha

Dr. Bhuwan Kumar Jha

Abstract- Many political parties and groups that emerged during the course of the freedom struggle espoused the cause of their communities. In doing so, they wished to be seen as representing their community vis-à-vis the British power in India and other political formations. Some of them also tried to combine a social reform agenda with their political ambitions. The All India Hindu Mahasabha, founded in 1915, claimed to represent the political voice of the Hindu community. Emerging from the womb of the Arya Samajists and the Sanatanists, the party left a definite impression on the course of the anti-imperialist struggle. In the initial years, the differences between the Congress and the Mahasabha were blurred. However, during and after 1927, a drift is visible which became prominent after the Round Table Conference. During 1934 and 1937 elections, the leaders of the Mahasabha were keen to adopt a more pragmatic stance. As the elections approached, new alignment of forces began to take shape, culminating in the birth of the Democratic Swarajya Party and the Congress Nationalist Party, which carried, to a large extent, the ideological contours left behind by the Responsive Co-operation Party and the Independent Congress Party of the Yesteryears. This paper attempts to unravel the political trajectory of the Mahasabha during a crucial period when it clearly drifted towards a pronounced anti-Congress position. From the Ajmer session in 1933, presided over by Bhai Parmanand, to the ascent of Savarkar as president in 1937, the party gradually took a hardline position, at clear variance with that of the Congress. During the period, alienation of a dominant section of the Mahasabha leadership from the Congress is clearly discernible. Presence of different shades of opinion within the party became obvious when it came to the question of defining the party's relationship with the Congress. The built up to the elections of 1934 and 1937, when the occasion demanded formation of different political alignments, further complicated the situation.

Bhai Parmanand and the Ajmer deliberations

Inside the Mahasabha, leadership belonged to a wide spectrum of ideological leanings. Relationship shared with the Congress became a defining feature. Leaders like Madan Mohan Malaviya and Lajpat Rai were equally popular within the Congress. There were also leaders like B.S. Moonje, N.C. Kelkar, M.S. Aney and others who were sometime with the Congress and sometime with the Mahasabha. On the other extreme of this spectrum were leaders like Bhai Parmanand and V.D. Savarkar.¹ Parmanand, a staunch Arya Samajist, growing up in the environs of Lahore, represented, along with Savarkar, and to some extent Moonje, the unflinching militant face of the Mahasabha. While many leaders of the Mahasabha often toyed with the idea of aligning with the Congress

in one form or another mostly at the time of contesting elections, he not only opposed all Congress-led movements, but often adopted a view opposed to that of the Congress in all matters of political importance. He continuously attacked the Congress for all the ills that afflicted the country, especially the problem of Hindu-Muslim discord. If Hindus had to "safeguard the small preserves that are left to them", advised Parmanand, then the "illusion" that the Congress had brought freedom to the country had to be "dispelled as quickly as possible".²

With Parmanand fully in command, the Ajmer session (14-16 October 1933) marked a significant departure in the political attitude of the party. He was hailed as the fittest to lead the Hindus at a "critical juncture, when their very existence was threatened".³ His election as

Dr. Bhuwan Kumar Jha is working as Assistant Registrar, University of Delhi. He obtained PhD from the department of history from University of Delhi.

president also signaled an important development in defining the Mahasabha-Congress relationship. In his long speech, delivered in Hindi, he accused the Congress of committing errors in judging the situation which, he concluded, had compelled Hindus to enter upon a "new struggle" destined to be "more formidable" than the previous ones.⁴ Moving somewhat far, Parmanand felt "an impulse" in him that the Hindus would "willingly co-operate with Great Britain if their status and responsible position as the premier community" was recognized in the "political institutions of new India".⁵ Parmanand's overt reference to co-operation with the colonial power drew sharp reactions from the Congress and some whippers from inside the Mahasabha too.

A prominent leader of the Mahasabha, B.S. Moonje, who had been unable to attend the Ajmer session, also expressed unhappiness at some of the resolutions passed at the Ajmer session.⁶ Jawaharlal Nehru, in a speech at the Banaras Hindu University, came down heavily on the Mahasabha's pretensions of representing the Hindus, labeling it "a small reactionary group":

*"The policy of the Mahasabha, as declared by its responsible leaders, is one of co-operation with the foreign government so that, by abasing themselves before it, they might get few crumbs...The Mahasabha shows its attachment to vested interests by openly condemning every form of socialism and social change. Any thing more degrading, reactionary, anti-national, anti-progressive and harmful than the present policy of the Hindu Mahasabha is difficult to imagine."*⁷

When asked about his opinion on the Mahasabha in an interview to the press some years later, he quickly replied, "I dislike the mentality of the Mahasabha of seeking favour from the Government."⁸

Responding to the criticism of his Ajmer-speech in general, and of his proposal to offer co-operation to the government in particular, Parmanand justified his action by taking a different view of politics altogether:

*"To my critics and opponents I have to say one thing that I do not think that politics is a religious creed or a dogma that must hold good for ever. In my view politics is a game of chess and the movements in that game have to be changed and modified in accordance with the outer circumstances."*⁹

The fate of erstwhile Responsivists

The Swarajya Party founded in December 1922 by C.R. Das and Motilal Nehru had been plagued by factionalism during 1925-26. Four prominent Congress-Swarajist leaders from Maharashtra, Jayakar, Moonje, Kelkar and Aney had formed a group within the party styling themselves as Responsivists.¹⁰ After the 1926 elections, this group lay low. However, after the second Round Table Conference was over, they were again beset with the idea of forming a new party. However, they were seemingly less enthusiastic this time,¹¹ and keen to wait for "further development of events" to unfold.¹²

With the blue print for a future constitution ready, preparations began afresh for launching political-cum-electoral fronts towards the end of 1933. The Maharashtra Political Conference, under an initiative taken by N.C. Kelkar, formed the Democratic Swarajya Party in October 1933, whose members would be drawn from that of the Congress. However, in opposition to the Congress, the party recognized direct action as a legitimate political weapon, and also expressed its willingness to accept public office and responsibility.¹³ Kelkar had been an indivisible part of the former Responsivist group. His initiative in launching a new front without consulting his old colleagues anguished Jayakar. He complained that this "mistake" of prematurely forming the new front had closed options for the erstwhile Responsivists to obtain a "respectful place" within the recently-revived Swarajya Party at the centre.¹⁴ He was keen that the old Responsivists should have rather stood "uncommitted to any parties or programmes except Responsivism" in order to create "a strong pressure" upon the newly-formed Swarajya Party.¹⁵

Going a step further, Jayakar lamented the lack of unity among Hindus and noticed a clear downslide in the strength of Hindu leaders:

*'There is a lot in it with which I agree, but my difficulty is that Hindus are so divided that no common action is possible...We were much stronger in 1926 when Lajpat Rai and Malaviyaji were more watchful of Hindu interests than of the Congress.'*¹⁶

Congress Parliamentary Board

By April 1934, there was a sizeable opinion within the Congress in favour of council-entry. It was decided to revive the All-India Swarajya Party (that had ceased to function since the Lahore Congress) as an effective political organisation under the auspices of the Congress. The revived Swarajya Party while rejecting the White Paper, stopped short of specifying its position with respect to the Communal Award.¹⁷ Malaviya was unhappy that the Swarajya Party's resolution on the White Paper had failed to deal satisfactorily with the issue of the Communal Award. He asked the Congress to declare boldly that "no constitution is worth having, which is not based on joint electorates pure and simple".¹⁸

The All-India Congress Committee, in its meeting on 18-19 May 1934, decided to formally suspend the civil disobedience and constituted a parliamentary board of not more than 25 members with Ansari as president. This parliamentary board would be the chief electoral front of the Congress party for contesting elections to the Assembly. In a tactical move aimed to pacify the Malaviya group, it was provided that this board would be constituted of equal number of nominees of Ansari and Malaviya.¹⁹ Malaviya was concerned about the predicament of his own position in the board, because his views on certain contentious matters were "pronounced".²⁰ Jagat Narain Lal saw enough chance of a conflict between the Congress and the Mahasabha as the Congress was likely to remain silent over the Communal Award.²¹

Though the general mood within the Mahasabha was opposed to the Communal Award, the party was unsure of its own political prospects. Malaviya's growing proximity to the Congress also came as a dampener. Moonje appeared pessimistic. Jagat Narain Lal was also aware of heavy odds against them.²² He complained that owing to his commitments with the Congress, Malaviya now felt "a good deal of awkwardness in identifying himself openly with the Hindu Sabha and the Hindu cause".²³ Moonje emphasized that if the Congress did not condemn the Award openly, then the Mahasabha would be compelled to set up its own candidates.²⁴ However, the Congress was still not willing to commit itself to a position of opposing the Communal Award. The working committee of the Congress in its meeting on 17-18 June 1934 made it clear that the Congress could "neither accept nor reject" the Award as long as a division of opinion lasts.²⁵ This re-assertion further frustrated the Mahasabha leaders. Parmanand condemned the decision of the Congress working committee in unqualified terms.

Congress Nationalist Party

Pushed to the corner, Malaviya and Aney now started exploring other options. Malaviya regretted not having taken a "bolder stand" on the Communal Award, and now readied himself to start an agitation against it.²⁶ After resigning from the Congress Parliamentary Board, Malaviya and Aney formed the Nationalist Party to "organise a campaign throughout the country" against the Communal Award and the White Paper.²⁷ An article in the *Servant of India* concluded that by forcing Malaviya and Aney out of the parliamentary board, the Congress had virtually forced the Mahasabha out of its own fold.²⁸

Some leaders within the Mahasabha were not fully convinced about Malaviya's wholehearted opposition to the Congress candidates. Ganpat Rai told Moonje that Malaviya, on account of "his commitments" with Gandhi, might refrain from setting up candidates against the parliamentary board candidates, but the Mahasabha could not afford to follow suit

because the unopposed return of the parliamentary board candidates would do harm to the party's declared position on the Communal Award.²⁹ He also felt that a contest between the Congress and the Nationalist Party or the Mahasabha candidates would be inevitable.³⁰ Moonje was however not afraid of opposition by and contest with the Congress, what worried him was the apprehension that Malaviya might "not put forth energy and enterprise in the fight".³¹

The inaugural conference of the newly-created Nationalist Party (Calcutta, 18th August) was held amid much fanfare largely because of the firm conviction of the Bengali Hindus of having been wronged by the Communal Award and the Poona Pact. "Believe me", clarified Malaviya, "Mr. Aney and myself spent many a day to see if there was any possibility of coming to an understanding before we finally decided to take this step".³² The party was named as the Congress Nationalist Party with the object of carrying on agitation against the Communal Award and the White Paper, both in the legislatures and outside, and setting up candidates for election to legislatures for promotion of this object.³³ The party played down its difference with the Congress, stating that while the candidates of both the parties, i.e. the Congress (or the Congress Parliamentary Board) and the Congress Nationalist Party, will fight for "the same political programme", the former will remain neutral on Communal Award and the latter will "oppose it tooth and nail".³⁴ Malaviya and Aney were also in touch with the Congress. Gandhi suggested the possibility of avoiding "conflict and bitterness" by jointly examining the position in each constituency on its merits and "demonstrably weaker party retiring from competition", and in any case leaving Aney and Malaviya's constituency alone.³⁵

The working committee of the Congress could not agree on Gandhi's proposal for making the weaker candidate retire in each constituency, but decided not to contest seats where Malaviya and Aney were candidates as well as those in Sind and in the city of Calcutta.³⁶ As expected, Moonje and Parmanand were not extended the same

privilege. Moonje's contest with his old foe Abhyankar also became curious.³⁷ From Bihar, Jagat Narain Lal complained that many Congress leaders including Rajendra Prasad had "strained every nerve" to put him down.³⁸ Jayakar had been clearly sidelined in these electoral alignments. When Malaviya, Aney and Moonje jumped into the electoral fray with the new party, i.e. the Congress Nationalist Party, he conveyed his displeasure:

*'A Party can not remain in the Congress and then agitate against it, taking advantage of its name, prestige and popularity. I am sure some time later you will also realize your mistake.'*³⁹

1934 Elections

When assessed in terms of ideological and party lines, the scene preceding the election was one of utter confusion. The viceroy Willingdon's mapping of the situation said it all. To a query on the prospects of different political formations in the elections of 1934, the viceroy showed helplessness as it had become "extraordinarily difficult" to reply to this question "satisfactorily".⁴⁰ He identified at least three political blocks in these elections- the "Malaviya lot" with both anti-White Paper and anti-Communal Award as the main plank; the "Gandhi lot" whose main plank was anti-White Paper alone; and the "solid block of Muslims" who would generally support White Paper, particularly the Communal Award.⁴¹

The Congress captured all seats open to general electorates in Madras, Orissa, U.P. and C.P. and lost two seats in the Punjab, three in Bengal and one seat each in Bombay and Ajmer. Out of these seven seats which the party lost, four were lost to the Congress Nationalist Party, which the working committee of the Congress was quick to claim as its own as they (the Congress Nationalist Party) were "pledged to vote with the Congress in all matters except the question of the Communal Award".⁴² The Congress Nationalist Party won seven seats: as many as four in Bengal, and one each in Berar, the Punjab and Sind.⁴³ Moonje lost to his bête-noire Abhyankar.

The Mahasabha's heavy defeat did not surprise Jayakar. He was especially critical of the way Malaviya had acted:

*'This seeming alliance with the Congress will not do. You cannot be in the Congress and agitate against it, any more than you can be in a joint Hindu family and ask for a partition.'*⁴⁴

Post-elections

After the elections were over and after the situation had stabilized a bit, fresh efforts were made to unify groups opposed to the Communal Award. Aney advocated forging the two entities, i.e. the Nationalist Party and the Democratic Swarajya Party, into "one common engine" to drive the "common cause of the two parties".⁴⁵ The Democratic Swarajya Party decided to explore the possibility of combining with the Nationalist Party to form an all-India party.⁴⁶ Moonje expressed the desirability of achieving political unity among non-Congress nationalist parties such as the Swarajya Party, the Responsive Co-operation Party, the Congress Democratic Swarajya Party and the Nationalist Party, if the Congress failed to "change its mentality in respect of Muslim communalism".⁴⁷ The Marathi leaders were always in favour of continuing with the separate existence of the Democratic Swarajya Party. Even a leader like Aney underlined that this party had "already proved its utility" and the main reason for its continuance was "to act as a safeguard against Congress going astray once again".⁴⁸ However, by the end of 1936, the brief honeymoon between the Congress Nationalist Party and the Democratic Swarajya Party was all but over. Aney's efforts to bring about a durable unity between the Democratic Swarajya Party and the Congress Nationalist Party had been unsuccessful. He consequently resigned as president of the former, as he felt that his differences with the view of the majority were of a "fundamental nature".⁴⁹ The latter, under the auspices of the other Marathi leaders, preferred to adopt a more clear anti-Congress posture.

During late 1936, as the elections under the new

provincial autonomy approached, the Congress leaders, particularly those in the Punjab, realized that the party's attitude on the Award had worked to limit its appeal. It was now made clear that the party's rejection of the Act of 1935 involved rejection of the Award as well. In August 1936, Nehru wrote to the Congress Nationalists of Bengal condemning the Award, saying that the issue could be solved ultimately only through independence.⁵⁰ The working committee of the Congress Nationalist Party expressed partial satisfaction at this change of the Congress attitude towards the Award and emphasized the need for sustained agitation against the Award.⁵¹

Elections of 1937

The elections of 1937 under provincial autonomy again posed the same unresolved question before the Mahasabha, i.e. whether to contest on its own or through political fronts like the Congress Nationalist Party and the Democratic Swarajya Party, or merely support candidates who promised to safeguard the 'Hindu' interests. The lack of internal cohesiveness on this issue was visible once again. Parmanand and Malaviya were again pulling in different directions. Malaviya wanted the Mahasabha to entrust the work of elections to the Congress Nationalist party, while Parmanand considered it advisable to leave the issue to the provincial Hindu sabhas, with the All-India Hindu Mahasabha providing moral and other kind of support to those provincial sabhas which decided to run elections.⁵² During the Lahore session of the Mahasabha (October 1936), conflict between the supporters of Malaviya and Parmanand became conspicuous. The session being organized in the stronghold of Parmanand, the organizers refused entry to the members of the U.P. Hindu Sabha, including Radha Kant Malaviya, as delegates.⁵³

Inside the Punjab, the non-Congress Hindu leaders, with the Mahasabha's support, formed a common executive committee called- the Hindu Election Board, which tried to counter the propaganda of the Congress and Malaviya's Nationalist Party. The Hindu Election Board won 11 seats in the province and the successful candidates formed the Hindu National

Progressive Party in February 1937.⁵⁴ In other provinces, the performance of the Mahasabha or groups supported by it was very dismal. In Bengal, it won two seats in the Assembly and one in the Council; one seat in the Central Provinces; one seat in Bombay Assembly and four seats in Sind Assembly.⁵⁵

New alignments and the final parting

As the elections got over, the issue of the policy to be followed inside provincial legislatures hogged the limelight. Following up logically on the political trend of the preceding years, the Nationalist Party shifted more intimately towards the Congress, while the Democratic Swarajya Party, centred in Maharashtra, merged with the Hindu Mahasabha. Aney and Malaviya were in close contact. Aney apprehended that few members of the Nationalist Party in the Assembly were contemplating to move to the Congress.⁵⁶ Malaviya realized that the likelihood of the Congress accepting office, coupled with the fact that its election manifesto had now declared the Communal Award to be unacceptable, would act as a "powerful influence" on many members of the Congress Nationalist Party to join the Congress.⁵⁷ Moreover, he himself did not appear to be averse to the idea of merger, as he underlined that even after merger one could continue to fight for "justice to Hindus" and for a "nationalist attitude in all political matters".⁵⁸ He made it pretty clear that the Democratic Swarajya Party, which had got affiliated to the Mahasabha, stood automatically disqualified from the Nationalist Party.⁵⁹ In May 1937, the Democratic Swarajya Party decided to delete the clause which had made it obligatory for its members to be Congressmen.⁶⁰ The end of 1937 was marked by the arrival of Savarkar on the political scene. The prominent Mahasabha-Congress leaders like Malaviya, Aney or Kelkar were conspicuous by their absence at the Ahmedabad session in December 1937 where Savarkar presided. Coming out of the somewhat bitter experience of 1934 and 1937 elections, with Congress-Mahasabha leaders like Malaviya no longer around, the Mahasabha was now geared to chart a more independent trajectory. With hardliners like

Savarkar, Parmanand and Moonje in command, the party sought increasing militarization of the Hindus. As its anti-Congress and pro-loyalist positions became more pronounced, the organization attempted to project itself as the true representative of the Hindu interests, in the same way as the League was seen as representing the Muslims.

References

1 Both Parmanand and Savarkar had been revolutionaries in their youth, but turned towards the Mahasabha in their later days. They combined in themselves an extreme contempt towards the Congress and the Gandhian method of non-violence.

They thought that the policy of non-violence had worked to make Hindu youth docile, defensive and less aggressive.

2 Bhai Parmanand's introduction to the draft history of the Hindu Mahasabha, Indra Prakash (in-charge of the Hindu Mahasabha History) to Moonje, 20-10-1938, Moonje Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi (hereafter NMML), Subject Files No. 50, Part II.

3 These words of praise came from Radha Kumud Mukherjee (chairman, reception committee), while proposing Parmanand's name as president of the party. See Indian Annual Register (hereafter IAR), July-December 1933, p. 201. He was elected president through a majority of votes. See Jagat Narain Lal (secretary, Hindu Mahasabha) to Moonje, 18-9-1933, Moonje Papers, NMML, Subject Files No. 32.

4 Indian Annual Register (hereafter IAR) July-December 1933, p. 204.

5 Ibid, p. 206.

6 to Ganpat Rai, 20-11-1933, Moonje Papers, NMML, Subject Files No. 35.

7 Speech at BHU, 12-11-1933, Selected Works of J.L. Nehru, Vol. VI, p. 157.

- 8 Interview to the press, Lahore, 2-6-1936, Tribune, 3-6-1936, Selected Works of J.L. Nehru, Vol. VII, p. 277.
- 9 Presidential address, All Bengal Hindu Political Conference, Calcutta, 18-19 January 1934, IAR, January-June 1934, p. 305.
- 10 They formed the Responsive Co-operation Party in opposition to the wishes of the mainstream Congressmen. This step proved crucial in diluting the support-base of the Swarajists, leading consequently to their defeat in the 1926 elections. Responsivists' chief demand was that the Swarajya Party should accept offices and other positions of responsibility offered by the government.
- 11 Moonje told Jayakar that it was high time to think of forming a new party for contesting forthcoming general elections. Moonje to Jayakar, 17-1-1933, Jayakar Papers, National Archives of India (hereafter NAI), File No. 236.
- 12 Jayakar to R.N. Mandalik, 4-4-1933, Jayakar Papers, NAI, File No. 236.
- 13 IAR, July-December 1933, p. 16. This restriction on being members of the Congress shall not be insisted upon until the Emergency Power Act banning the functioning of Congress bodies is repealed.
- 14 Jayakar to Aney, 13-4-1934, Jayakar Papers, NAI, File No. 207.
- 15 Jayakar to Moonje, 10-4-1934, Jayakar Papers, NAI, File No. 207.
- 16 Jayakar to Jagat Narain Lal, 18-4-1934, Jayakar Papers, NAI, File No. 207.
- 17 Meeting at Ranchi, 2-3 May 1934, IAR, January-June 1934, pp. 271-81. Among the Responsivists, only Aney had been invited to this conference, but even he could not attend due to family reasons. Aney to Moonje, 24-4-1934, Moonje Papers, NMML, Subject Files No. 39.
- 18 9-5-1934, IAR, January-June 1934, pp. 281-82.
- 19 Ibid, pp. 32, 285-94.
- 20 Jagat Narain Lal to Moonje, 10-6-1934, Moonje Papers, NMML, Subject Files No. 37.
- 21 Jagat Narain Lal to Moonje, 14-6-1934, Moonje Papers, NMML, Subject Files No. 37.
- 22 Jagat Narain Lal to Moonje (undated), Moonje Papers, Subject Files No. 39.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 Moonje's opinion appeared in the Anand Bazar Patrika of 10 June 1934. The opinion was referred in Jagat Narain Lal to Moonje, 10-6-1934, Moonje Papers, NMML, Subject Files No. 37.
- 25 17-6-1934, IAR, January-June 1934, pp. 35, 300. The working committee pointed out that with the "White Papers lapsing", the "Communal Award must lapse automatically".
- 26 Jayakar to Sapru, 22-6-1934, Jayakar Papers, NAI, File No. 408. Malaviya was in Bombay at this meeting and met Jayakar few times.
- 27 Circular issued by Malaviya and Aney, 8-8-1934, Aney Papers, NMML, Subject Files No. 6. Also see, IAR, July-December 1934, pp. 28-29. The working committee of the Mahasabha welcomed this resignation as a "bold and courageous stand" which would "vindicate their honour and self-respect". 28-29 July 1934, IAR, July-December 1934, pp. 308-9.
- 28 Editor, Servant of India to Moonje, 2-8-1934, Moonje Papers, NMML, Correspondence.
- 29 Ganpat Rai to Moonje, 8-8-1934, Moonje Papers, NMML, Subject Files No. 37, Part II.
- 30 Ganpat Rai to Moonje, 9-8-1934, Moonje Papers, NMML, Subject Files No. 37, Part II.
- 31 Moonje to Ganpat Rai, 10-8-1934, All-India Hindu Mahasabha Papers, NMML, File No. C-1.
- 32 IAR, July-December 1934, pp. 30, 260-65.
- 33 Ibid. P.C. Ray, president of the reception committee hoped that the new party would be "a party within the

sheltering bosom of the Congress".

34 'Congress Nationalist Party: What it stands for and why every Indian should support it', printed booklet issued by Malaviya and Aney, M.M. Malaviya Papers, NMML, Microfilm, Roll No. 1/1.

35 Gandhi to Malaviya, 3-9-1934, Aney Papers, NMML, Subject Files No. 6. He also appealed to Malaviya not to put any candidate against Asaf Ali.

36 Wardha, 9th and 11th September 1934, IAR, July-December 1934, p.204.

37 Hindustan Times, 13-10-1934, Moonje Papers, NMML, Subject Files No.38.

38 Jagat Narain Lal to Moonje, 17-10-1934, Moonje Papers, NMML, Subject Files No.38.

39 Jayakar to Moonje, 21-9-1934, Moonje Papers, NMML, Subject Files No.37, Part II.

40 Willingdon to Hoare, 3-9-1934, Templewood Papers, NMML, Microfilm, Roll No.3.

41 Ibid.

42 Patna, 5-7 December 1934, IAR, July-December 1934, pp.224-25.

43 Ibid, pp.225-26.

44 Jayakar to Ganpat Rai, 23-11-1934, Aney Papers, NMML, Subject Files No.7.

45 Aney to Jagat Narain Lal, 4-12-1934, Aney Papers, NMML, Subject Files No.6.

46 Meeting at Akola, 5-8-1935, IAR, July-December 1935, pp.20, 319-20.

47 First Andhra Swarajist Conference, Moonje's presidential address, 24-8-1935, Moonje Papers, NMML, Subject Files No.44.9

48 Aney's presidential address at the Democratic Swarajist Conference, Chalisingaon, 10-11-1935, Times of India, 12-11-1935, Moonje Papers, NMML, Press Clippings, Sr. No. 7.

49 Aney to Ganpat Rai, 19-9-1936, Ganpat Rai Papers, NMML, Correspondence.

50 See Gerald A. Heeger, 'The Growth of the Congress Movement in Punjab, 1920-1940', Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.32, No. 1, November 1972, pp.39-51.

51 Benaras, 31 August-1 September 1936, IAR, July-December 1936, p.6.

52 Interview with Daily Herald, Lahore, 6-1-1936, Anand Bazar Patrika, 9-1-1936, Moonje Papers, NMML, Press Clippings, Sr.No.8.

53 They were allowed entry as visitors which they refused. Malaviya was conspicuous by his absence. Parmanand traced the genesis of his difference with Malaviya to the issue of contesting elections, because he (Parmanand) had insisted throughout, that as long as separate electorate continued, the Mahasabha must canvass for the Hindu seats. 18th session of the Hindu Mahasabha, Lahore, 21-23 October 1936, IAR, July-December 1936, pp. 259, 261. The UP Hindu Sabha was recognized by the Malaviya faction as the local Hindu Sabha within the province. Also see Ganpat Rai to Moonje, 24-9-1936, Ganpat Rai Papers, NMML, Correspondence.

54 See Heeger, 'The Growth of the Congress Movement in Punjab, 1920-1940'.

55 Ganpat Rai pointed out that the Mahasabha backed the Congress Nationalist Party, but the latter would not come forward lest it should get linked with the Mahasabha. See 'Oral Transcript of Ganpat Rai', NMML, pp.35-36.

56 Aney to Malaviya, 14-4-1937, M.S. Aney Papers, NMML, Subject Files No.6.

57 Malaviya to Aney, 26-4-1937, M.S. Aney Papers, NMML, Subject Files No.6.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 Times of India, 31-5-1937, Moonje Papers, NMML, Press Clippings, Sr. No. 9.